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KEEP THE LICENSE AGREEMENTS COMING: 
THE EFFECTS OF 
J.E.M. AG SUPPLY, INCORPORATED V. 
PIONEER HI-BRED INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED 
ON UNIVERSITIES' USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAWS TO PROTECT THEIR PLANT GENETIC 
RESEARCH 
INTRODUCTION 
Some universities and professors invest scarce resources in 
researching plant genetics. These universities and professors 
need to be aware of patent laws to protect their investments 
and resulting discoveries, as well as to avoid infringing on 
others' patents. 1 Further, being well-versed in the law will 
allow universities to better understand their options when they 
negotiate licensing and settlement agreements. 
Intellectual property (IP) in the plant genetic field has 
become an important issue-not just to universities-but to 
governments, farmers, and corporations around the world. 
There are at least two reasons for this. First, we are globally 
interconnected more than ever before and overseas markets are 
1. Goldie Blumenstyk, U. of Rochester Risks Millions in Patent Fight with 
Pharmaceutical Giants, Chron. of Higher Educ. (Sept. 20, 2002) (for example, a 
University of Rochester professor, Dr. Young, filed his first patent in 1992 and is now 
engaged in a high-stakes infringement suit. "Dr. Young says he didn't quite appreciate 
how complicated and contentious the process could be. For a brief moment, in fact, he 
even considered not using a lawyer at all. 'I thought it was so easy that maybe I should 
do it myself-that you wrote to the patent office and they sent you a form,' he recalls."). 
See rtenerally Goldie Blumenstyk, Universities Try to Keep Inventions From Going 'Out 
the Back Door': To Keep Hold of Lucrative Licenses, Institutions Educate, Cajole, and 
Sometimes Sue, Chron. of Higher Educ. (May 17, 2002) ("[P]rofessors may not realize 
that the university might also claim inventions developed during consulting, if the 
invention overlaps with their university work." Further, universities certainly have a 
financial incentive to educate their researchers and track university research projects 
to prevent researchers from "going over the wall" or going "out the back door" to patent 
and license their inventions.); U. of W.Va. Bd. of Trustees v. Vanvoorhies, 278 F.3d 
1288 (W.Va. 2002). 
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important to United States corporations. Second, plant genetic 
research is advancing rapidly; thus, we are compelled to 
promptly enact laws to govern new biotechnologies such as 
plant gene transfer. 
New biotechnologies lead to cases of first impression arising 
in the court system. In 2001, the United States Supreme Court 
decided J.E.M. Ag Supply, Incorporated v. Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International, Incorporated (J.E.M.). 2 Clarifying an important 
question, the Court held that plant varieties may be patented 
under the utility patent statute3 and that the Plant Patent Act4 
(PP A) and Plant Variety Protection Act5 (PVP A) are not the 
sole means of patenting plant varieties. 6 The Court's holding 
clarified an ambiguity that affected both universities and 
corporations that engage in plant breeding and plant genetic 
research. 
This comment will first provide a general overview of the 
three means by which plant-inventions can be protected: the 
general utility patent, the PP A, and the PVP A The comment 
will then discuss what factors affected the outcome of the 
J.E.M. case and conclude with a discussion of the importance of 
plant-related patents to United States universities. The 
primary question this comment addresses is what impact will 
the J.E.M. case have on universities involved in plant genetic 
research? As will be discussed, universities are finding a new 
source of revenue as well as a new source of liability in the 
proliferation of intellectual property from plant genetic 
research. 
I. THREE TYPES OF IP PROTECTION FOR PLANTS 
Patent law is meant to provide incentive for people and 
companies to invest in research and product development. 7 
2. 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (hereinafter, the parties are abbreviated in the text as 
"J.E.M." and "Pioneer"). 
3. 35 U .S.C. § 101 et seq. (2000). 
4. 35 U .S.C.§ 161 et seq. (2000). 
5. 7 U.S.C. § 2321 et seq. (2000). 
6. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 145. 
7. "The patent laws promote this progress [of science] by offering inventors 
exclusive rights [i.e., a monopoly] for a limited period as an incentive for their 
inventiveness and research efforts." Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) 
(quoting Kewanee Oil Co. u. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-481 (1974); Universal Oil 
Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944)). 
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The J.E.M. case affirmed the lower court's holding that plants 
are patentable subject matter under the utility patent statute 
as well as the PP A and the PVP A. This section briefly 
compares and contrasts these three IP schemes.8 
A. General Utility Patents 
The Constitution gives Congress power "[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries."9 Building on the 
Constitutional language, Thomas Jefferson authored the 
Patent Act of 1793. 10 Jefferson's language laid the foundation 
for what has become Title 35 of the United States Code section 
101, which provides for the issuance of utility patents. The 
statute states that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title." 11 
The utility patent applicant must provide a "specification" 12 
that contains a "clear" and "concise" written description of the 
invention sufficiently detailed "as to enable any person skilled 
in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same."13 
In addition, the specification "shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention." 14 
To obtain a utility patent, the applicant must show that the 
plant is "new, useful, and nonobvious." 15 If the applicant seeks 
a utility patent for a plant, he or she must include a reasonable 
8. For more in-depth coverage of these three schemes, see generally Elisa Rives, 
Mother Nature and the Courts: Are Sexually Reproducing Plants and Progeny 
Patentable under the Utility Patent Act of 1952, 32 Cumb. L. Rev. I87 (200I-2002). 
9. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. For a more developed history of laws and cases 
affecting the patentability of plants, see Nancy J. Linck, Patentable Subject Matter 
Under Section 101-Are Plants Included?, 67 J. of the Pat. & Trademark Off. Socy. 489, 
489-496 (Sept. I985). 
10. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308. 
11. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2002). See Act of Feb. 21, I793, §I, I Stat. 3I9 (Jefferson 
authored the Patent Act of I793 in which he defined § 10 I subject matter as "any new 
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful 
improvement [thereof]") (quoted in Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308). 
12. a5 U .S.C. § 1ll(a)(2)(A) (2000). 
13. 35 U .S.C. § 112 (2000). 
14. ld. 
15 . • J.E.M., 5a4 U.S. at 142 (citing a5 U.S.C. §§ 101-103). 
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plant description, which generally means that the applicant 
must submit a deposit of the biological material, e.g., seeds, 
plant tissue cells, etc., in a designated repository where the 
material will be publicly available.l6 These requirements 
exceed those found in the PP A or the PVP A. 
Utility patents provide broad rights to the patent holder, 
including the right to file multiple claims17 and the right to 
prevent others from making or even using the invention 18 
during a twenty-year term. 19 In patent infringement cases, the 
utility patent allows the patent holder to receive "damages 
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event 
less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention 
by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by 
the court."20 
Compared to alternative patenting schemes, the utility 
patent requires more applicant input (e.g., detailed written 
description of the invention), but it also provides heightened 
protections. Seed companies like Pioneer rely on the utility 
patent's protection against saving seed. For example, if seed is 
patented and licensed under the utility patent, the purchasing 
farmer may not save seed for reuse on the farm the next year. 21 
Rather, in most cases, the farmer must buy more seed each 
year. 
16. ld. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801-1.809 (2001) (regarding disclosure by persons 
seeking to patent biological material under the utility patent statute). 
17. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more 
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
applicant regards as his invention."). 
18. The utility patent includes: 
the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the 
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the 
United States, and, if the invention is a process, ... the right to exclude 
others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or 
importing into the United States, products made by that process. 
:35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(l) (original language adopted in Act of April 10, 1790) (italics 
added). 
19. 35 U .S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
20. 35 U .S.C. § 284 (2000). 
21. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299 (2002) (Monsanto sued 
McFarling, a farmer, for patent infringement of Roundup Ready soybeans. The license 
agreement prohibited the farmer from saving seed for replanting. Citing .J.E.M., the 
court held that "the right to save seed of plants registered under the PVPA docs not 
impart the right to save seed of plants patented under the !general utility] Patent 
Act."). 
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The utility patent is the most expensive form of protection; 
however, the protection is broader than PPA protection because 
the utility patent applies to "anything under the sun that is 
made by man"22 while the PP A and PVP A apply only to certain 
new plant varieties. 23 
B. Plant Patent Act 
In 1930, Congress passed the PPA, which specified that 
asexually-reproduced plants are proper subject matter covered 
by section 101 (the utility patent statute).24 In 1952, the PPA 
provisions were moved to section 161 et seq.25 Under the PPA, 
the patent holder has the right to exclude others from 
asexually reproducing the plant, and from using, offering for 
sale, or selling the plant so reproduced, or any of its parts, 
throughout the United States, or from importing the plant so 
reproduced, or any parts thereof, into the United States.26 
The PPA protects only plants reproduced by vegetative 
propagation (i.e., asexual reproduction), including cuttings, 
budding, and grafting_27 This category "include[s] many 
ornamental plants for landscaping, certain vegetable and fruit 
species and certain [turfgrasses]."28 To protect against 
22. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Sen. Rep. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. 
Rpt. 82-1923, at 6 (1952) (statement made by P.J. Frederico, a principle draftsman of 
the 1952 Act, Hearings on HR. 3760 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee 
on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1951) (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 60 F. 
618, 620 (W.D.Pa. 1894)))). See generally Linck, supra n. 9, at 493. 
2:3. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2002) ("Whoever invents or discovers and asexually 
reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant ... may obtain a patent therefore ... ") 
(italics added). See 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2000) (PVPA provision). 
24. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2002) (provides: "Whoever invents or discovers and asexually 
reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including ... hybrids ... , may obtain 
a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."). 
25. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 1:33. 
26. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (2000). 
27. Web Garden, Ohio Master Gardener Program, Ohio St. U. Extension, 
<http://www.hcs.ohio-state.edu/mg/manuallprop2.htm> (accessed Dec. 26, 2002); see 
Rives, supra n. 8, at 199 ("The PPA provides the plant breeder patent protection to a 
single claimed plant with a unique characteristic, either physiological or anatomical, 
that can be cloned by grafts, buds, or cuttings, resulting in a new plant with the same 
characteristic.") (citing Andrew F. Nilles, Plant Patent Law: The Federal Circuit Sows 
the Seeds to Allow Agriculture to Grow, 35 Land & Water L. Rev. :355, 861 (2000)). 
28. E-mail from Robert R. Fincher, Dir., Tech. Commercialization Off., U. of Ga., 
to Timothy P. Daniels (Oct. 22, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels). 
776 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2003 
infringement, the PP A was amended in 1998 to include "plant 
parts."29 
Generally, applicants for section 161 plant patents must 
meet the same requirements as section 101 applicants.30 
Diverting from the utility patent provisions, however, PP A 
grants are limited to one claim only,31 and the PPA description 
need only be "as complete as is reasonably possible."32 
C. Plant Variety Protection Act 
In 1970, Congress passed the PVPA, which generally 
provided that developers of sexually reproduced plant variety 
could obtain a PVP certificate through the Plant Variety 
Protection Office. 33 The applicant must show that the plant 
variety is new, distinct, uniform, and genetically stable. 34 
Further, the applicant must deposit some of the protected seed 
in a public depository, though "neither the [PVPA] statute 
[Title 7 of the United States Code section 2422(4)] nor the 
applicable regulation mandates that such material be 
accessible to the general public during the term of the PVP 
certificate."35 PVP A protection "is designed for particular types 
of plants that require the ability to sexually reproduce [via 
pollen, seeds, etc.] on a large scale in order to be commercially 
valuable."36 
29. Pub. L. 105-289, § 2, 112 Stat. 2780 (Oct. 27, 1998) (provided that: "(a) 
Findings. - The Congress makes the following findings: ... (3) Plant parts produced 
from plants protected by United States plant patents are being taken from illegally 
reproduced plants and traded in United States markets to the detriment of plant 
patent holders. (4) Resulting lost royalty income inhibits investment in domestic 
research and breeding activities associated with a wide variety of crops. . . . Such 
research is the foundation of a strong horticultural industry. (5) Infringers producing 
such plant parts from unauthorized plants enjoy an unfair competitive advantage over 
producers who pay royalties on varieties protected by United States plant patents.") 
30. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000) ("The provisions of this title relating to patents for 
inventions shall apply to patents for plants, except as otherwise provided."). See 
J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 133 ("To obtain a plant patent under§ 161 a breeder must meet all 
of the requirements for§ 101, except for the description requirement."). 
31. Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1564 (2d Cir. 1995) 
("Only a single claim is permitted in a plant patent." (citing 37 C.F.R. § L 164; Manual 
o(Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1605 (Rev. 14, Nov. 1992))). 
32. 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2000). 
33. 7 U.S. C.§ 2402 (2000). 
34. 7 U.S. C.§ 2402 (2000). 
35. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 143; see 7 C.F.R. 97.6 (2001). 
36. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 4-5, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 200 I) (available at 
2001 WL 1196195). 
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The primary provisions of the PVP A are as follows: The 
PVP A prohibits marketing a protected variety but allows 
breeding (making crosses) with the protected variety. 37 Though 
the PVP holder can prevent others from selling the protected 
seed and thus stop commerce, she cannot stop people from 
using the protected seed to make other hybrids. 38 The PVP A 
protects not only the specific protected variety but also 
essentially derived varieties. 39 The PPA and utility patent 
statute do not exempt saving seed for use on the farm. 40 Under 
the PVPA, however, a farmer may "raise a crop one year [and] 
save seed to use for himself the next year."41 The PVPA also 
includes an exemption for research.42 
37. 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a) (2000) (the PVPA states that without express permission, 
no one may: "(1) sell or market the protected variety, or offer it or expose it for sale, 
deliver it, ship it, consign it, exchange it, or solicit an offer to buy it, or any other 
transfer of title or possession of it; (2) import the variety into, or export it from, the 
United States; (3) sexually multiply, or propagate by a tuber ... , the variety as a step 
in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety; (4) use the variety in producing (as 
distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom.") 
38. E-mail from Robert R. Fincher, Dir., Tech. Commercialization Off., U. of Ga., 
to Timothy P. Daniels (Dec. 16, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels) (Dr. Robert 
Fincher notes, "[U]niversities primarily rely on Plant Patents and PVP [certificates] for 
protecting their plants. I don't believe many universities are filing utility patents on 
plants unless the plant claim is part of a set of claims to a transgenic modification of 
plants."). 
39. 7 U.S.C. § 2541(c)(l) (2000) ("[a]n essentially derived variety (EDV) is a 
variety that is (1) 'predominantly derived from another [initially protected] variety,' (2) 
'clearly distinguishable from the initial [protected] variety,' and (3) except for 
differences that result from the act of derivation, conforms to the initial variety in the 
expression of the essential characteristics that result from the genotype or combination 
of genotypes of the initial variety except for differences that result from the act of 
derivation, conforms to the initial variety in the expression of the essential 
characteristics that result from the genotype or combination of genotypes of the initial 
[protected] variety."); 7 U.S.C. § 2401(a)(3) (2000). 
40. Telephone Interview with RichardS. Cahoon, Cornell U. Pat. & Tech. Mktg. 
(Nov. 5, 2002). 
41. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 5, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (2001 WL 
1196195) (Original statement was a question.). See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2002). 
Saving seed has a long and significant history. Inbreeding crops such as wheat 
or soybeans pollinate themselves; genetically, the seed of inbreeding crops produces an 
exact clone of the parent plant, commonly called "true-to-type" reproduction. Before 
seeds were patented under section 101, farmers purchased non-patented seed from a 
breeder such as Pioneer. After growing the crops, the farmer would save some seed 
("bin-run seed") for replanting the next season and sell the rest on the market. As long 
as the farmer could legally save seed, he did not need to return to the breeder and buy 
more. 
On the other hand, hybrid-seed crops, such as corn, do not reproduce true-to-
type. Rather, there is genetic variation in the "F2" generation. If the farmer tried to 
save and replant seed produced by hybrid "Fl" plants, he would end up with a non-
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Compared to the utility patent statute, the PVP A provides 
very low-level protection. In fact, the PVPA system has been 
described as being "almost a registration system ... [in which] 
you fill out a form, and it's granted without any kind of a 
rigorous examination as utility patents undergo in the United 
States."43 Due to recent advances in biotechnology, the PPA 
and PVPA are often deemed insufficient protection because 
they protect plant varieties from being marketed by 
unauthorized parties but they do not protect unauthorized 
parties from using the genes in those varieties in the 
development of new varieties.44 One practitioner noted that 
"any plant-related gene patent, seed component patent, 
transformation patent or plant improvement patent would not 
qualify for PVP [protection] and therefore require a patent or 
trade secret status for effective protection." 45 Researchers 
sometimes seek to patent a process or plant trait-not a 
variety-so the PP A and PVP A would be unsuitable means of 
protection. In passing the PVP A, Congress intended "to afford 
adequate encouragement for research and for marketing when 
appropriate, to yield for the public the benefits of new 
varieties."46 
Since patents can be costly, researchers must do a cost-
benefit analysis when deciding what level of IP protection to 
uniform crop. Interview with Jeff Maughan, Assoc. Prof., Dept. of Plant & Animal Sci., 
B.Y.U. (Dec. 3, 2002). "Thus, a farmer who wishes to continue growing hybrid plants 
generally needs to buy more hybrid seed." J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 128. 
42. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2000) ("The use and reproduction of a protected variety for 
plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringement of the 
protection provided under this chapter."). 
43. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 26, ,J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. :l, 2001) (available at 
2001 WL 1196195). 
44. Br. of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Property Law Assn. in Support of 
Respt. Supporting Affirmance at 4, J.E.M., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (available at 2001 WL 
649829) ("Today, the scope of subject matter relating to plants that can meet the 
requirements of section 112 far exceeds single plant varieties, as defined by either the 
PPA or the PVPA. In contrast, the protection afforded by plant patents and PVPA 
certificates extends only to plant 'varieties."'). 
45. E-mail from John Grace, Germplasm Licensing Coord., Pioneer Hi-Bred Inti., 
Inc., to Timothy P. Daniels (Jan. 7, 2003) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels). 
46. 7 U.S.C. § 2581 (2000) ("Constitutional clauses 3 and 8 of article I, section 8 
are both relied upon."); see Janice M. Strachan, Plant Variety Protection: An Alternative 
to Patents, <http://warp .nal. usda.gov/pgdic/Probe/v2n2/p lant.ht m I> (accessed Nov. 16, 
2002) (Janice M. Strachan, a Senior Examiner at the Plant Variety Protection Office, 
suggests that the intent of the PVPA was to "'encourage the development of novel 
varieties of sexually reproduced plants' by providing their owners with exclusive 
marketing rights of them in the United States."). 
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seek, if any. Utility patents generally cost between $10,000 
and $20,000. Thus, universities tend to use the utility patent 
only when they want to protect a very valuable discovery. 
Plant patents generally cost between $5,000 and $10,000.47 
PVP certificates cost approximately $3,000, including fees for 
the application, examination, and certificate.48 For universities 
that have tight budgets and little confidence in the commercial 
value of a new plant variety, the PVPA provides an economical 
level of IP protection.49 
II. OVERVIEW OF J.E.M. AG SUPPLY, INCORPORATED V. PIONEER 
HI-BRED INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED 
The issues involved in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Incorporated v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Incorporated have been brewing 
for decades. Before 1930, plant breeders' patent applications 
were rejected by the United States Patent & Trademark Office 
(USPTO) for two reasons: (1) The applications lacked a 
sufficient written description of the plant to be patented, and 
(2) plants were considered "product[s] of nature,"50 even though 
humans clearly interfered with nature in the breeding process. 
In 1930, Congress passed the PPA "to get over the two 
historical hurdles of section 112, [the] written description 
requirement and the so-called product of nature doctrine."51 
In 1980, the Court decided Diamond v. Chakrabarty. 52 The 
issue in Chakrabarty was whether a human-engineered 
bacterium could receive utility patent protection. The 
particular bacterium in question was commercially valuable 
because it was "capable of breaking down multiple components 
of crude oil"-a property "which [was] possessed by no 
47. Cahoon, supra n. 40. 
48. Plant Variety Protection Off., General Information, 
<http://www.ams. usda.gov/science/pvpo/pvp.htm#What is the total cost of protection?> 
(accessed Nov. 9, 2002). 
49. E-mail from Jeff Maughan, Assoc. Prof., Dept. of Plant & Animal Sci., B.Y.U. 
(former corporate researcher), to Timothy P. Daniels (Nov. 20, 2002) (copy on file with 
Mr. Daniels) (compared to holding a utility patent, "holding only a PVP certificate or 
PPA patent may be construed as a weaker negotiating stance-but it nonetheless 
provides the necessary legal protection that mandates that both parties come to an 
amicable licensing/royalty agreement prior to commercialization of the product."). 
50. d.F..M., 5:34 U.S. at 134 (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 311-312). 
51. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 28, d.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available at 
2001 WL 1196195). 
52. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305. 
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naturally occurring bacteria."53 Here, the Court held that 
living things were patentable under section 101 if they were of 
human derivation.54 
J.E.M. presented a different question-whether the PPA 
and PVPA preempted section 101 in relation to protecting 
plants, and thus made general utility patents unavailable to 
new plant varieties. 55 In 2001, the United States Supreme 
Court decided the J.E.M. case and held that "newly developed 
plant breeds fall within the terms of section 101, and that 
neither the PPA nor the PVPA limits the scope of section 101's 
coverage."56 
After presenting the essential facts of the J.E.M. case, this 
section will consider the holding, some issues raised in the 
case, the Court's analysis, and some implications of the 
holding. 
A. The Facts of the J.E.M. Case 
Although the J.E.M. case involved two private businesses, 
the holding has implications for universities that engage in 
plant genetic research. The primary facts from the case are as 
follows: Pioneer is a major player in the United States seed 
corn market, holding about forty percent of the annual $5 
billion market.57 J.E.M. is an agricultural supply company. 
Pioneer held seventeen utility patents protecting its inbred 
and hybrid corn seed products. 58 J.E.M. purchased from 
Pioneer hybrid corn patented by Pioneer. Pioneer sold its corn 
under a limited license agreement, which prohibited the 
licensee from reselling the corn. J.E.M. resold the licensed 
seed and Pioneer sued for patent infringement. 
The particular seed that was resold by J.E.M. was protected 
by both a utility patent and a PVP certificate. Pioneer, 
53. Id. at 305. 
i14. ld. at i313 ("[T]he relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate 
things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made 
inventions."). 
55. See ,J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 127. 
56. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 145. 
57. Mike Godwin & Victoria Slind-Flor, "Patent Plums," The Year in IP, Almanac 
2001, IP Worldwide 66, 70 (Oct. 2001) (according to Victoria Slind-Fior, "[p]atent owner 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., a subsidiary of E.I. du Pont de Nemours and 
Company, maintains about a 40 percent share of the $5 billion annual market for seed 
corn in the United States."). 
58 . • J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 127. 
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however, only sued for infringement of the utility patent, 
presumably because J.E.M. did not violate Pioneer's rights 
under the PVPA.59 
J.E.M. counterclaimed, arguing that Pioneer's utility patent 
was invalid because the PPA and PVP A were the "exclusive 
statutory means for the protection of plant life because these 
statutes are more specific than section 101, and thus each 
carves out subject matter from section 101 for special 
treatment."60 
B. The Holding of the J.E.M. Case 
The Court held that Congress did not intend to remove 
plants from section 101 coverage and that "neither the PPA nor 
the PVPA limits the scope of § 101's coverage."61 Rather, 
Congress provided different statutory "products"--each with its 
own requirements and level of protection.62 The utility patent 
provides great protection while the PVPA provides less due to 
exemptions for saving seed and research. Thus, inventors or 
breeders may choose which "product," or patent, they want to 
"purchase." This scheme may be comparable to how State 
Departments of Motor Vehicles offer regular drivers' licenses as 
well as commercial drivers' licenses. Each licensing scheme 
entails certain rules, responsibilities, and privileges. 
C. Issues Raised in the J.E.M. Case 
Three primary issues were addressed in the J.E.M. case: (1) 
congressional intent, (2) impermissible statutory overlap, and 
59. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 18, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available at 
2001 WL 1196195) (referring to 7 U.S.C. § 2541(d), J.E.M. claimed that J.E.M. "didn't 
do anything to infringe" on Pioneer's PVPA rights. 7 U.S.C. § 254l(d) says that 
[Pioneer's] rights are not infringed by the "perform[ance of] any act concerning 
[seed] ... of a protected variety [i.e., Pioneer's protected corn] that is sold or otherwise 
marketed with the consent of the owner in the United States, unless the act involves 
further propagation of the variety .... "). 
There is some ambiguity as to whether the word "sold" refers (1) only to Pioneer's 
initial sale to J.E.M. or (2) to any sale of the protected seed. If situation (1) is correct, 
then J.E.M. did nothing wrong because its buyer apparently did not further propagate 
the variety. If interpretation (2) is correct, then it is immaterial that J.E.M.'s customer 
did not further propagate the protected variety because J.E.M. sold the seed without 
Pioneer's consent. 
60. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 129. 
61. ld. at 145. 
62. ld. at 142 ("[T]here is a parallel relationship between the obligations and the 
level of protection under each statute."). 
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(3) the need for broad interpretation of patent laws. A few of 
the Court's ancillary concerns are also noted below. 
1. Congressional Intent 
The outcome of the J.E.M. case largely depended on the 
Court's interpretation of Congress's intent. J.E.M. argued that 
Congress does not pass legislation to be redundant. "If the 
patent laws before 1930 [i.e., the utility patent statute] allowed 
patents on 'plants' then there would have been no reason for 
Congress to have passed the 1930 PPA and to have limited the 
scope of plant patent protection to plants reproduced by 
asexual methods."63 J .E.M. presented hard evidence 
(documentation) of Congress's intent in passing the PVP A. 
J.E.M. submitted page one of a House Report, which states the 
following under the "Purpose" heading: 
Under patent law, protection is presently limited to 
those varieties of plants which reproduce asexually, that 
is, by such methods as grafting or budding. No 
protection is available to those varieties of plants which 
reproduce sexually, that is, generally by seeds. Thus, 
patent protection is not available with respect to new 
varieties of most of the economically important 
agricultural crops, such as cotton or soybeans.64 
This appears to be pretty clear evidence that Congress did not 
intend for the utility patent to cover sexually-reproduced 
plants. 
J.E.M. argued that, in passing the PPA, the 1930 Congress 
intended "to expand the definitional limits of [the utility patent 
statute]."65 Further, the 1930 Congress interpreted the utility 
patent statute as not including plants. Thus, it was error for 
the USPTO to ever issue a utility patent for a plant, and 
Pioneer's patent was thus invalid.66 Countering J.E.M.'s 
63. Br. of Pet. at 19, J.E.M., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (available at 2001 WL 199137). 
64. ld. at 40 (citing H.R. Rpt. 91-1605, at 6 (Oct. 13, 1970)). 
65. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 10-11, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available 
at 2001 WL 1196195); see Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (Jefferson authored the 
Patent Act of 1793 in which he defined section 101 subject matter as "any new and 
useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful 
improvement [thereof]") (quoted in Cha.krabarty, 447 U.S. at 308). 
G6. Br. of Pet. at 10, J.E.M., 531 U.S. 124 (2001) (available at 2001 WL 199137). 
Utility patents that are issued to provide federal protection of sexually 
reproducing corn plant varieties and their seeds are invalid. Seeds, seed 
grown plants and the parts thereof are not included within the ambit of the 
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argument, one Justice responded that the PPA did not 
constitute "an explicit prohibition" against protecting plants 
with a general utility statute.67 The Court concluded that since 
Congress did not explicitly state that plants were excluded from 
section 101 coverage, utility patent coverage was available for 
plants. 
2. Impermissible Statutory Overlap 
Besides arguing Congressional intent, J.E.M. raised the 
issue of conflicting statutes. J.E.M. claimed that numerous 
statutory provisions conflicted with those of the utility patent. 68 
For example, the PVP A exempts research and saving seed, 
whereas such uses are prohibited under the utility patent 
statute.69 J.E.M. argued that "[t]he issuance of PVP 
certificates and utility patents on sexually reproducing plant 
varieties ... would result in impermissible dual federal 
protection and direct conflicts in the scope of the federal 
protection granted on the same attribute-the ability to 
sexually reproduce the plant variety."70 
As an amicus, the United States noted that the Department 
of Agriculture, at the time of argument, had issued a total of 
approximately 5,000 PVP certificates while the USPTO had 
only issued about 1,800 utility patents for plants. 71 The 
Government "s[aw] no incompatibility between the two systems 
of protection."72 The Court rebuffed J.E.M.'s argument and 
found that the different provisions of the two laws "do not 
present irreconcilable conflicts because the requirements for 
obtaining a utility patent under§ 101 are more stringent than 
those for obtaining a PVP certificate, and the protections 
utility patent subject matter .... Rather, federal protection of the corn seed 
products at issue in this case is exclusively obtainable under the provisions of 
the Plant Variety Protection Act .... 
67. ld. at II (italics added) (at issue is the old legislative intent problem about 
whether we assume the answer is "no" unless Congress specifically says "yes" or 
whether we say "yes" unless Congress has explicitly indicated "no"). 
68. ld. at 22 24. 
69. ld. at 22. 
70. ld. at 10. 
71. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 41, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available at 
2001 WL 1196195). 
72. ld. at 41-42. 
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afforded by a utility patent are greater than those afforded by a 
PVP certificate."73 
Interestingly, as Pioneer began oral argument, Justice 
Kennedy foreshadowed a possible concern of the Court. Justice 
Kennedy stated that 
in many statutes, if A, B, and C are covered [by section 
101] and C [i.e., plant matter] is then removed [and 
placed in section 161], we make the inference that C is 
not intended to be covered any longer [by section 101]. 
But in this case, the under the sun language shows that 
they are such expansive terms in [section] 101, that 
perhaps we don't apply that usual rule and that 
[Pioneer] would prevail because of the terms being so 
general and so universal in ... their coverage.74 
The Court took the view that the 1952 Congress stated the 
anything-under-the-sun75 doctrine with the specific intent to 
preserve section 101's broad application. Congress basically 
said, "Yes, we are moving the PP A provisions to a separate 
chapter, but the utility patent statute still applies to anything 
under the sun, including new plant varieties." 
Besides employing the anything-under-the-sun doctrine, 
the majority used another canon of statutory construction to 
justify its holding. This canon states that repeal by implication 
is appropriate only "when the earlier and later statutes are 
irreconcilable."76 As mentioned before, the Court found no 
irreconcilable conflicts because the utility patent statute, the 
PP A, and the PVP A have different requirements and provide 
different levels of protection. 77 The Court therefore held that 
Congress did not intend to remove plants from section 101 
coverage and that "neither the PP A nor the PVP A limits the 
scope of§ 101's coverage."78 
73. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 142. 
74. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 24, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available at 
2001 WL 1196195). 
75. Sen. Rep. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. Rpt. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). 
76. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 141-142 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 
(1974)). 
77. ld. at 142. 
78. ld. at 145. 
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3. Need for Broad Interpretation of the Utility Patent Statute 
Another important issue in the J.E.M. case was the need 
for the Court to give a broad reading to the utility patent 
statute. Pioneer argued that section 101 has always been 
interpreted broadly because we never know what scientific 
developments tomorrow will bring. The terms of section 101 
"need to be general because the patent law needs to fit ever-
changing circumstances [and] because ... we are not in a 
position to foresee what tomorrow's inventions will be." 79 
Further, Pioneer noted that the "utility patent protection is so 
critically important to people in [the seed] industry is 
because . . . seeds are so easily copied by sclf-replicating."80 
The Court purposefully gave section 101 a broad reading 
because "[a] rule that unanticipated inventions are without 
protection would conflict with the core concept of the patent 
law that anticipation undermines patentability."81 
At least one Justice expressed concern regarding the 
research exemption during oral argument, referring to the 
PVP A's research exemption as "a very important special 
exemption."82 In response, the United States explained that 
section 101 did not have a research exemption for a reason. 
"When greater research and development, greater disclosure, 
and higher standards for qualifying a patent have been met, 
there has been more of a contribution to public knowledge 
which, under our intellectual property laws, justifies a greater 
exclusive right for a limited period of time."83 
On the other hand, J.E.M. noted some drawbacks with 
providing utility patent protection to plant materials. 
"[P]atents are being used to stop ... the free use and 
transmission of genetic material."84 Recall that plant material 
79. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 24, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available at 
2001 WL 1196195). 
80. Id. at 35. 
81. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316. 
82. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 44, ,J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available at 
2001 WL 1196195). 
83. ld. at 44. 
84. Ld. at 22 (the PVPA's coverage of essentially derived varieties affects both 
corporate and university breeders. Before the PVPA was enacted, breeders were free to 
share plant genes. By combining genes in different ways, breeders could improve 
crops. With the PVPA in force, protected varieties (containing genes that were 
previously shared freely) are tied up, hindering breeding progress. Suppose, for 
example, that Monsanto develops a superb gene that makes plants drought resistant, 
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patented under section 101 is not freely available for research. 
Because plant germplasm is being effectively "lock[ed] up" by 
[utility] patent protection, the agricultural industry has 
responded by consolidating.85 Professor Jeff Maughan 
explained that 
conglomeration has occurred because, in the middle of 
the biotech boom, large corporations realized it would be 
more profitable to own an entire revenue stream from 
development of genes to production of seed. Thus, 
Monsanto purchased seed companies like Dekalb and 
Asgrow, and DuPont purchased companies such as 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International. Not only did these 
acquisitions assure better revenues, but they also 
provided access to the best available germplasm and to 
established brand names, while protecting the 
acquirer's outlet to the market.86 
Oddly, J.E.M. raised this argument even though it is not a 
research institution that is adversely affected by section 101's 
lack of a research exemption. 
D. Critique of the Court's Analysis 
The majority in J.E.M. focused on two facts: (1) Under 
Chakrabarty, the test is whether the invention is "human-
made" or a "product of nature."87 (2) The PVP A does not 
"purport to provide the exclusive statutory means of protecting 
sexually reproduced plants."88 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer pointed out that the Court's 
reliance on Chakrabarty is improper. He noted that the 
question in Chakrabarty was whether § 101's "language 
'manufacture, or composition of matter,' [citation omitted] ... 
included such living things as bacteria-a substance to which 
neither [the PPA nor the PVPA] refers."89 Justice Breyer 
raised a good point. The majority's reliance on Chakrabarty 
would be more appropriate if Congress had been silent 
and Pioneer develops a gene that makes the plants' fruit very delicious. The individual 
varieties are PVP protected by the respective company. Unless some agreement is 
made, we will never enjoy a plant that includes both genes and both characteristics.). 
85. Id. 
86. Cahoon, supra n. 40. 
87. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 134 (citing Chakrabarty, 4-17 U.S. at :n:3). 
88. Id. at 138. 
89. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 148 (2002) (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
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regarding IP protection for plants. Here, however, Congress 
provided explicit statutes covering plant varieties-the PP A 
and the PVPA. Thus, the question becomes, as Justice 
Kennedy hinted, whether plants should be excepted from § 
101's anything-under-the-sun rule since the PPA and PVPA 
specifically provide IP protection for plant varieties. 
However, even if plant varieties were properly excludable 
from section 101 protection, plant biotechnology has developed 
to the point at which protecting new varieties is only a small 
portion of patentable plant matter.90 The weakness in this 
argument is that section 101 would still provide protection for 
"processes" and "compositions of [plant] matter" that do not fall 
under the PVPA's purview.91 
Furthermore, the Court's holding perpetuated the USPTO's 
established practice of issuing utility patents for plant 
varieties. Justice Thomas noted that the USPTO has already 
issued "some 1,800 utility patents for plants, plant parts, and 
seeds."92 In contrast, as of November 12, 2002, the USPTO had 
granted approximately 13,230 plant patents under section 161 
(PPA).93 
Justice Ginsburg raised another point in favor of affirming 
the decision in favor of Pioneer. She suggested that it may be 
proper for the Court to pay some deference to the USPTO and 
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals since those entities have 
more expertise in patent matters.94 
E. Implications of the Court's Holding 
The J.E.M. holding will have a significant effect on seed 
manufacturers, farmers, and universities. Seed manufacturers 
may rest assured that first, they will be able to obtain utility 
patent coverage for the varieties they develop and second, that 
90. Br. for Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Property Law Assn. in Support of 
Respt. Supporting Affirmance at 4, .J.E.M., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (available at 2001 WL 
649829). 
91. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
92. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 127. 
93. See e.{?. plant patent number PP13,233, USPTO, USPTO Patent Full-Text and 
image Database, <http://patft. uspto.gov/netahtmllsrchnum.htm>. 
94. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 8, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available at 
2001 WL 1196195) (question from Justice Ginsburg to J.E.M.: "As far as ... the issue 
that is before us, we do have a position of the PTO and of the Federal circuit, both 
having more expertise than the rest of the Federal court we're on in these questions. 
Don't we owe those decision makers some deference?"). 
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they may force farmers to purchase new seed. As utility 
patent-protected seeds come to dominate the seed market, 
farmers will lose the legal ability to save seed for replanting 
the next season. Thus, farmers' seed costs will rise; however, 
the farmer will probably avoid some costs for pesticide, 
herbicide, or weather-related crop loss, depending on the type 
of G M seed used. 
As the biotech revolution rolls on, small-scale farmers will 
come into more frequent contact with patent issues. "Most all 
of the new seeds being developed, whether genetically modified 
or convention[al], are being patented."95 This can be an 
especially controversial issue since some seed developers are 
allowed to patent the seeds they develop with government 
funding (tax monies).96 
Universities engaged in plant genetic research will also be 
affected by the J.E.M. holding. Because the Court upheld the 
applicability of section 101 to plants, the university can require 
remuneration if someone uses the university's patented 
germplasm even for research. Recall that researchers are not 
required to give remuneration if the plant variety they are 
using is merely protected by a PVP certificate. Under the 
PVP A, the university can only prevent unlicensed persons from 
selling the protected variety or "using it in producing (as 
distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different 
variety .... "97 
It is very difficult to accurately quantify the financial 
effects universities would feel if they were limited to PVP or 
PP A protection. From a financial standpoint, allowing the 
section 101 to cover plants is good for universities because it 
allows them to obtain stronger protection of valuable 
discoveries and thus receive greater remuneration via licensing 
95. Marilyn Bay Wentz, Whose Seed is it Anyway?, Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union, 
<http://www.rmfu.org/News/Stories/ShowFeature.cfm?ID=81> (accessed Dec. 5, 2002) 
(Ms. Wentz quotes Dave Dechant, an alfalfa, wheat, corn and barley producer from Ft. 
Lupton, Colorado: "The rights granted by patents are broad and give patent owners 
market rights, which mean[s] [that] future seed contracts could obligate the grower to 
market his product through specific channels .... Such agreements would have serious, 
long-term negative consequences for America's independent family farmers and 
ranchers."). 
96. Id. ("Purdue University's recent development of nematode resistant soybeans 
incorporated public funding and producer checkoff dollars. Private company Access 
Plant Technology, Inc., now has an exclusive license to the soybean seed patent."). 
97. 7 U.S.C. § 2483(a)(l) (2000). 
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revenues. Accordingly, universities have more bargaining 
power now that plants are clearly patentable subject matter 
under the utility patent statute. 
However, the days of easy-come, easy-go research are 
waning. Greater use of IP protection for plants makes it more 
difficult and expensive for the research community to build on 
the discoveries of universities that hold utility patents. 
Information sharing is hindered because researchers are less 
likely to reveal their findings until they know whether or not 
their findings are patentable. Also, utility patent protection for 
plants makes research more expensive because, without a 
research exemption, one university cannot freely use plant 
material that has been patented by another university. Of 
course, the utility patent holder can simply enter an agreement 
to allow other universities to use the protected plant for 
research purposes, but creating such a legal arrangement 
entails its own costs. To be fair, such an agreement could 
include a license provision requiring the university to forfeit or 
share revenue derived from discoveries that stem from use of 
the protected plant material. 
Ill. UNIVERSITIES' USE OF IP LAWS TO PROTECT THEIR PLANT 
GENETIC RESEARCH 
IP protection is important to universities that engage in 
plant genetic research. This section will discuss (1) how 
universities have been a major player in plant genetic research; 
(2) universities' and corporations' use of intellectual property to 
protect their plant genetic research; (3) collaboration between 
universities and private corporations; (4) collaboration between 
the federal government and universities; (5) the influence of 
the Bayh-Dole Act; (6) universities' interaction with foreign 
entities; and (7) trends involving plant IP. 
A. Universities' Historical Role in Plant Genetic Research 
Universities have played a major role in plant genetic 
research. One professor noted, "Transgenic plants currently in 
production [such as corn, soybean, and canola] were developed 
by corporate scientists. Nonetheless, the basic discoveries ... , 
without which plant biotechnology would be impossible, were 
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mostly made in university laboratories."98 Some specific 
examples are notable. In 1976, Dr. Mary-Dell Chilton led a 
group of researchers at the University of Washington in 
discovering that "a bacterial cell could transfer some DNA to a 
plant cell."99 While studying as a graduate student at 
Washington State University, Ray Sheehy helped develop the 
FlavrSavr® tomato plant, the first transgenic plant 
commercialized in the United States. 100 In 1983, Washington 
University, St. Louis, joined the University of Ghent and 
Monsanto Corporation in DNA uptake experiments involving 
gene transfer. Today, Agrobacterium-mediated gene transfer is 
a widely-applied technique used "to achieve the transfer of 
DNA to plants."101 Further, Roger Beachy of Washington 
University, St. Louis, is a pioneer in the production of virus-
resistant plants, 102 and Steven Tanksley and his lab at Cornell 
University have contributed to the discovery and cloning of 
pathogen-resistance genes. 103 
B. Universities' and Corporations' Different Approaches to 
Plant-Related Intellectual Property 
Universities and private corporations approach patents 
differently. This section will discuss how universities and 
private corporations differ in (1) their reliance on patenting 
and licensing revenue; (2) the research projects they choose to 
pursue; (3) the emphasis they place on publishing findings 
versus maintaining confidentiality; (4) their incentive to recoup 
investment; and (5) their use of plant patents and PVP 
certificates. 
1. Patents and Licenses as New Sources of Revenue 
While corporations have long recognized the value of 
patents and licenses, universities are still discovering these 
new revenue streams. As the IP trend continues, professors 
will likely feel more incentive to become IP-savvy as their 
universities turn toward patents to protect their inventions, to 
98. Paul F_ Lurquin, High Tech Harvest 116 (Westview Press 2002)_ 
99. !d. at 79. 
100. !d. at 190, ch. 5, n. L 
101. !d. at 93. 
102. !d. at 106. 
103. !d. at 108. 
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maintain their freedom to operate, and to generate a revenue 
stream. 104 The university system is simple. Universities 
patent their inventions and then publish their findings; 
thereafter, corporations read about the new technology and 
seek a license from the university. Licensing often leads to 
profit sharing agreements between the researcher-inventor and 
the university. 105 For universities, a new revenue stream 
means more funding, improved programs and facilities, and 
ultimately better education for students. 106 
Further, university professors are generally not paid 
exorbitant salaries, so a new revenue source-i.e., from patents 
and licensing-may be very attractive. 107 However, licensing 
revenue is not a university's nor a professor's sole interest. 
Receiving a royalty from a plant patent or license is "icing on 
the cake" so to speak.108 Most universities still focus on doing 
good research; but if money from patents or licenses is 
available, universities will pursue it. 109 
2. Subjects of Research-Which Project to Pursue? 
Universities and corporations differ in the research projects 
they choose to pursue. University professors are more likely to 
look at long-term research even though it might have very little 
104. Cahoon, supra n. 40. 
105. ld.; see Boyce Thompson Inst., BTl Pat. Policy, <http://bti.cornell.edu/bti2/ 
bti2 __ page.taf'?page=patent_policy> (accessed Nov. 16, 2002) (Cornell's Boyce Thompson 
Institute, a plant research facility, maintains a patent policy that seeks to "assure that 
creative works at the institute are encouraged and rewarded while providing for the 
public good. Often this can best be achieved by patent protection of inventions in order 
to encourage industrial commercialization of research results, while benefiting BTl and 
the individual inventors."). 
106. Cahoon, supra n. 40; see Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept 
University, The Atlantic Online <http://www .theatlantic.com/cgi-
bin/o/issues/2000/03/press.htm> (accessed Dec. 14, 2002) (Gordon Rausser, who 
negotiated a deal between University of California, Berkeley and Novartis, argues in 
support of university-corporation partnerships. A Berkeley alumni magazine quotes 
Rausser as saying, "Without modern laboratory facilities and access to commercially 
developed proprietary databases . . . we can neither provide first-rate graduate 
education nor perform the fundamental research that is part of the University's 
mission.") (original article printed in The Atlantic Monthly (Boston) (Mar. 2000)). 
107. Cahoon, supra n. 10. 
108. ld. 
109. Id.; see Blumenstyk, supra n. 1 (Dr. Donald Young and the University of 
Rochester are engaged in "the highest-ante patent battle ever undertaken by a 
university." They are "seeking billions of dollars in royalties from the companies that 
make and market Celebrex, an enormously successful arthritis drug."). 
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economic value. On the other hand, corporations are more 
likely to do a cost-benefit analysis to estimate the profitability 
of a potential research project. no Also, some large corporations 
are becoming specialists in applied plant genetic research, 
seeking to incorporate university discoveries into marketable 
products.m 
Universities and private corporations may have different 
motives for researching the negative aspects of their 
experiments in plant genetics. One view is that corporations 
do not have as much incentive to research possible negative 
effects of their biotech products because they focus on 
profitability rather than environmental or health concerns. 112 
One concerned individual noted that corporations tend to 
limit the scope of research that they fund, and are 
unlikely to support research intended to produce 
findings that extend general scientific know ledge. They 
often are unwilling to fund the extensive exploration 
that may be necessary to explore all of the possible 
negative and harmful effects that may result from use of 
the products of such research. 113 
However, another view is that corporations monitor their 
biotech products because profitability is undermined if the 
genetically-altered gene breaks down and harms the 
environment or human health. Thus, corporations do have a 
motive to research the negative effects of their products (e.g., 
genetically-modified seeds).ll4 
On the other hand, universities are less concerned with 
profitability because they have other sources of revenue such 
as state budget appropriations. Universities are also more 
likely to conduct research that will benefit the general 
public. 115 
llO. Cahoon, supra n. 40. 
lll. ld. 
112. E-mail from Michael Marsh, Bd. Member at Large, C. Puget Sound Ch., 
Wash. Native Plant Socy., to Timothy P. Daniels (Nov. 10, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. 
Daniels). 
113. ld. 
114. Cahoon, supra n. 40. 
115. Marsh, supra n. 112 ("A research university with funding from a public 
agency would be much more likely to support research by faculty members in areas 
that may produce discoveries which will either extend and enlarge our general 
scientific knowledge, or will be immediately (and obviously) beneficial to members of 
the general public. There will also, very likely, be more collateral research to explore 
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3. Publishing Findings and Maintaining Confidentiality 
Universities are generally more concerned with publishing 
their findings, while corporations are generally more concerned 
with maintaining confidentiality until their discovery is 
patented.ll6 This is an important difference because 
patentability is undermined if "the invention was patented or 
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign 
country . . . more than one year prior to the date of the 
application for patent in the United States."117 In collaborating 
with universities, corporations are reasonably concerned that 
the university may prematurely release the corporately-funded 
invention into the public domain. Such release undermines 
patentability and the corporation's potential revenue stream.118 
4. Recouping Their Investment 
Unlike universities, corporations require patents as a 
means to recoup their investment.l 19 While other sources of 
possible negative consequences of use of such discoveries. Such collateral research is 
required by law in certain fields of investigation (for example, before drugs for human 
use are released by the Food and Drug Administration), but are not uniformly required 
in agriculture (despite limited jurisdiction by the Environmental Protection Agency) or 
many other fields."). 
116. E-mail from Stephen Smith, Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. to Timothy P. 
Daniels (Nov. 25, 2002) (copy on frle with Mr. Daniels) (e-mail includes language from 
,John Grace, Germplasm Licensing Coord., Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.) (In 
negotiating with corporations, "Universities almost always require the right to 
continue to use their invention, and often want the right to publish their results and 
sometimes [the corporation's] own [results]. Generally we [the corporation] can get 
around this [i.e., can forestall publication and thus preserve patentability] with a 
review period for evaluating an invention for patentability. Some amount of 
confidentiality is required for us [corporations]."). See E-mail from Daniel Fairbanks, 
Professor, Dept. of Plant & Animal Sci., B.Y.U., to Timothy P. Daniels (Nov. 20, 2002) 
(copy on file with Mr. Daniels) (Prof. Daniel Fairbanks noted, "Since publication is the 
expected outcome of any research at a university, defensive publishing is a much better 
way to protect our work. There is little to no commercial potential for most of the 
products we produce, so the only reason to patent them is to prevent others from 
patenting them. Since defensive publishing is much less expensive and easier than 
patenting, it makes sense for us to use it."). 
117. 35 U .S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
118. Smith, supra n. 116 (e-mail language from John Grace in Smith e-mail). 
119. I d. (language of Stephen Smith) ("The ability to obtain patents for inventions 
in plant breeding is critical to ... maintaining research investments.") See generally 
Stephen Smith, NIAB, BBP Satellite 1 Colloquium Within the Generic Project Meeting: 
Molecular Tools for Biodiversity, Vienna, December 1996 (published in Molecular 
Screening News No, 11) Plant Variety Identification & Registration (available at 
<http://www.niab.com/bbp/vienna.htm>) (accessed Dec. 2, 2002) (Dr. Smith noted, "If 
we suspect someone is using our material unlawfully, we send our lawyers out to see 
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revenue help immunize universities from investors' hesitations, 
private plant genetics research companies are vulnerable to 
market fluctuations. 120 Thus, if the Court had ruled against 
Pioneer Hi-Bred in the J.E.M. case (i.e., had held that plants 
cannot be protected by section 101 utility patents), universities 
would not have been as affected as plant biotech corporations. 
Plant biotech companies are very vocal whenever IP protection 
for plants is threatened; 121 hence, in the J.E.M. case, 
corporations such as Monsanto, Cargill, BASF, and Delta Pine 
and Land Company submitted amicus briefs supporting 
Pioneer, even though Pioneer was a business competitor. 
While universities have less need to recoup their 
investment, they do have an interest in the revenue and 
prestige that can accompany a valuable patent. For example, 
Columbia University's "royalty revenue for the 2000 fiscal year 
was more than $143 million." 122 University researchers still 
have financial incentive to conduct research because they 
receive a cut of the royalties. 123 Incidentally, from a brief 
him or her. For example in 1980, we found what we thought was one of our inbreds in 
the background of another [competitor's) hybrid in the U.S. and we sued. Things 
progress[ed] very slowly in the U.S. courts but they finally ruled in 1994 that indeed 
that company had used our germ plasm. . So in 1994 we rec.eiv.ed a ch.eque for [46. 7] 
million dollars, so ... there is real money involved here.") ($46.7 million figure 
provided in e-mail from Stephen Smith, Pioneer Hi-Bred, Inc., to Timothy P. Daniels 
(,Jan. 8, 2003)). 
120. SeedQuest, News Releases, Bionova R&D Operations at DNA Plant 
Technology Corporation to be Shut Down, <http://www .seedquest.com/News/releases/ 
2002/may/4464.htm> (accessed Nov. 16, 2002). ("The focus of DNAP's [DNA Plant 
Technology Corporation] research has been the production of transgenic plants which 
provide improved disease resistance for fruit and vegetable crops. Concerns about 
public acceptance of transgenic products in these markets have made producers 
reluctant to invest in the development of transgenic fruits and vegetables. Further, the 
agricultural industry has been suffering with reduced prices in the past few years, 
leading growers, food companies and other providers to delay new R&D investment. 
Despite an intensive search, these factors have made it difficult for the company to 
develop new customers. With this absence of a customer base, DNAP has not been able 
to obtain venture capital or other financing sufficient to continue R&D operations."). 
121. Smith, supra n. 116 (language of John Grace) (if utility patent coverage of 
plants were threatened, "[u]niversities might not scream to the same extent we 
[corporations] would, because while their licensing is important to both revenue 
generation and also to maximum consumer benefit, the revenue stream is not their life 
blood (as it is ours)."). 
122. Goldie Blumenstyk, Knowledge is 'a Form of Venture Capital' for a Top 
Columbia Administrator, Chron. of Higher gduc. A24 (Feb. 9, 2001). 
123. "In general, BTl will reward researchers for generating Patents by 
distributing 30% of net revenues from licensing arrangements to Inventors. . . . The 
remaining 70% of net revenues shall be utilized by BTL" Boyce Thompson In st., supra 
n. 105. 
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review of the USPTO database, it appears that individual 
inventors, professors and researchers receive the patent, but 
they list the university's research foundation as the assignee. 124 
Bio-ag companies have invested years' of research in 
developing genetically modified crops that can resist 
herbicides, insects, and climate fluctuations. Patents, 
including PVP certificates, are virtually the only means of 
protecting a corporation's investment and making its efforts 
profitable. In a full-page advertisement in an agricultural 
journal, the Monsanto Corporation asked farmers to refrain 
from illegally replanting patented seed and thus protect the 
economic incentive to invest m bio-ag research and 
development. 125 
One might assume that universities have less to lose 
because they may receive federal grant funding; however, 
patents are still important to universities for a variety of 
reasons. Patenting a valuable discovery can bring prestige and 
significant revenue. Further, patenting is "seen as very 
favorable" and may have a positive effect on professors' 
compensation and eligibility for tenure or promotion. 126 
Though not required for tenure, patenting is a "leveraging 
point." 127 Professors who patent their valuable research may 
be more likely to abandon ship and go work for a private 
company that can offer a better salary. If the university is 
going to retain such valuable, patenting professors, the 
124. See e.g. patents 5,648, 599; 6,420,547; 6,395,964; and 6,268,552 at USPTO, 
supra n. 9:l. 
125. Monsanto's advertisement read: 
It takes millions of dollars and years of research to develop the biotech crops 
that deliver superior value to growers. And future investment in biotech 
research depends on companies' ability to share in the added value created by 
these crops. Consider what happens if growers save and replant patented 
seed. First, there is less incentive for all companies to invest in future 
technology, such as the development of seeds with traits that produce higher-
yielding, higher-value and drought-tolerant crops .... In short, these few 
growers who save and replant patented seed jeopardize the future 
availability of innovative biotechnology for all growers. And that's not fair to 
anyone. 
See Martha L. Crouch, How the Terminator Terminates, Synthesis/Regeneration 18 
(Winter 1999) (available at <http://web.greens.org/s-r/18/18-16.html>) (accessed Nov. 9, 
2002). 
126. Interview with Jeff Maughan, Assoc. Prof., Dept. of Plant & Animal Sci., 
B.Y.U. (,Jan. 6, 200:3). 
127. ld. 
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university will probably need to increase their compensation or 
recognize the professor's value in some other way. 
Because universities generally do not have a profit motive, 
they are less concerned with potential patent infringement 
when choosing among different lab techniques. Dr. Paul 
Lurquin implies this in his recent book, High Tech Harvest: 
[T]oday there are two techniques very widely applied to 
achieve the transfer of DNA to plants: One is the 
Agrobacterium-mediated gene transfer and the other is 
biolistics [or "gene gun technology"]. Of the two, 
academic scientists much prefer the first one, owing to 
its predictability and versatility-it works well with 
numerous types of plants. Corporate scientists are more 
divided; for them, patents and potential patent 
infringements are as great a concern as the feasibility of 
the techniques themselves. 128 
Royalties from utility patents can be substantial, although 
they do not provide the university with a predictable source of 
income since researchers usually do not know when they will 
make a valuable discovery. Furthermore, although some 
university researchers may not expect to license their 
inventions immediately, they may nonetheless obtain a patent 
because it "might be useful some day."129 
It is difficult to quantify the value that a breakthrough 
discovery can have to a university because a patent's value can 
be measured in various ways. 130 Methods of measuring value 
include the following: (1) licensing revenue for the university 
and the patenting professor, (2) positive publicity (which may 
help in recruiting top researchers and students), (3) increased 
likelihood that the university or its researchers may receive 
future federal funding for continued research, and (4) a good 
reputation among potential donors and industry. 
128. Lurquin, supra n. 98, at 93. 
129. E-mail from Adam Bogdanove, Asst. Prof., Dept. of Plant Pathology, Iowa St. 
U., to Timothy P. Daniels (Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels). 
130. "How do you measure [the) value [of a patent]? By how much revenue the 
patent brings in? Or by how much it boosts a company's market value?" Godwin & 
Slind-Flor, supra n. fi7. SP.P. How Colleges Get More Bang (or Less) From Technology 
Transfer, Chron. of Higher Educ. (July 19, 2002) ("For the growing number of 
universities eager to commercialize the inventions of their professors and graduate 
students, success-and failure--is measured in many ways. Money is only the most 
obvious one."). 
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5. Universities' and Corporations' Use of Plant Patents and PVP 
Certificates 
Despite the important role that university researchers 
continue to play in the development of plant genetic 
technologies, private corporations hold the overwhelming 
majority of the plant patents and PVP certificates. Data from 
the USPTO provided the following information: From 1977 to 
2001, Yoder Brothers, a corporation, received 599 plant patents 
from the USPTO.l31 Yoder was the top plant patentee during 
this period. The second and third places were also held by 
corporations: Bear Creek Gardens, Inc. received 263 plant 
patents, and Canard-Pyle Company received 216 patents.l32 
In first place among universities was the Regents of 
University of California, ranked thirteenth overall, receiving 
eighty-two plant patents. Holding the second place among 
universities was Rutgers University (thirty-eighth on list), 
which received only thirty-four plant patents. Obviously, 
universities have received (and have probably applied for) far 
fewer plant patents than private corporations. 
This phenomenon may be partly due to the fact that 
university researchers are less concerned with patents than 
corporate researchers or that they may not be as 
knowledgeable about the provisions of IP law.133 Being more 
IP-savvy, corporations succeeded in patenting plants and 
processes that were primarily developed m university 
lab ora tories. 134 
131. USPTO, Information Products Division/TAF Branch, Plant Patents: January 
1, 1977-December 31, 2001, <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taflplant.pdf> 
(accessed Nov. 25, 2002). 
132. Id. 
133. For example, Prof. Paul Lurquin noted that the Monsanto team 
"demonstrated great foresight" in 1983 when it-along with research teams from 
University of Ghent and Washington University, St. Louis-developed Agrobacterium 
mediated gene transfer while studying crown gall. 
At that point [in 1983], no patents had been granted to anybody, simply 
because it was not yet an accepted norm (as it is today) for academic 
scientists to file patent applications for their discoveries. Monsanto's 
participation in fundamental crown gull research would allow the company to 
claim precedence in the field of plant genetic engineering. 
Lurquin, supra n. 98, at 82. 
134. Id. ("Academic scientists have been remarkably incompetent at protecting 
their intellectual property. Although some have had foresight to protect their work, by 
and large, they never realized that their work would have the impact-good or bad-
that it now has on society. The field was wide open for corporations to claim ownership 
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Although universities use plant patents, corporations are 
the primary users. A USPTO report provided the following 
data regarding the numbers of plant patents granted to 
universities from 1977 to 2001, inclusive, as well as the 
universities' overall rank among corporations, universities, and 
government agencies: 135 
,~ 
Universities' Use of Section 161 Plant Patents: 1977-2001 
Rank Number Of 
Among Universities University Name Plant Patents Overall Rank Received 
1 Regents of University 82 13 
of California 
2 Rutgers University 34 38 
3 Cornell Research 23 49 
Foundation, Inc. 
4 Purdue Research 22 52 
Foundation 
5 University of 12 95 
Arkansas 
6 Iowa State University 11 103 
Research Foundation, 
Inc. 
7 Regents of University 11 108 
of Minnesota 
8 Washington State 10 116 
University Research 
Foundation, Inc. 
9 Colorado State 8 126 
University Research 
Foundation 
10 University of Illinois 7 145 
11 Board of Regents of 6 163 
University of 
Nebraska 
12 TexasA&M 5 191 
University System 
1a University of 5 192 
Connecticut 
14 University of Florida 5 193 
Board of Regents 
15 University of 5 194 
Tennessee Research 
Corporation 
These top fifteen university entities obtained a total of only 
246 plant patents during the noted twenty-five-year period. 
of basic technologies that most of them hardly helped develop (except through financial 
support)."). 
135. USPTO, supra n. 131. 
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United States corporations (including the universities), the 
United States Government, and United States individuals 
obtained a total of 5, 788 plant patents during the noted time 
period. Thus, the top fifteen universities (including research 
foundations and Boards of Regents) obtained only 4.3 percent 
of the plant patents granted.136 Though not precise, the 4.3 
percent figure is sufficiently accurate to tell us that 
universities received comparatively few plant patents. 
It is clear that corporations, not universities, are the major 
players in patenting plants. The USPTO plant patent report 
also indicates that United States corporations received 4, 183 
plant patents since 1977. Thus, out of all United States 
corporations, universities as a subset received only 246 of the 
4,183 or 5.9 percent of all the plant patents.l37 
The same pattern seems to hold true with PVP certificates. 
During FY 1971-2002, public sources (i.e., universities and 
agricultural experiment stations) submitted an average of 
thirteen percent of the PVP applications received each year by 
the PVP Office. 138 Browsing through the PVP 
Application/Certificate Status Database, 139 one notices that 
private corporations are the predominant applicants. 140 
Although corporations dominate the PVP statistics, it appears 
that universities have a bit more use for the PVP than the 
PPA. 
Let's not be misled, however. Just because corporations 
receive more plant patents and PVP certificates does not mean 
that these protections are not vital to universities. Without IP 
protection and the consequent licensing revenues, research 
136. This statistic is not entirely accurate, however, because the USPTO report 
contains only "national and international organizations (i.e., corporations, universities, 
government agencies) that have received five or more U.S. plant patents since 1977." 
/d. 
137. Again, this statistic only accounts for entities that received at least five plant 
patents during the noted time period. 
138. E-mail from Janice M. Strachan, Senior Examiner, Plant Variety Protection 
Office, to Timothy P. Daniels (Nov. 21, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels). Ms. 
Strachan provided data in a table entitled University-Applicants. 
139. Plant Variety Protection Office, PVP Application/Certificate Status Database, 
<http://www.ars-grin.gov/cgi-bin/npgs/html/pvplist.pl> (accessed Nov. 25, 2002). 
140. The student author conducted a search of the PVP Applicant/Certificate 
Status Database, inserting "university'' in the "Applicant or Owner Name" field. The 
search resulted in a list of approximately 300 PVP certificates granted to university 
entities. The 300 "hits" included about 100 PVP certificates issued for varieties of 
common wheat and about 70 certificates issued for varieties of soybean. 
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universities would have less financial ability to carry on their 
plant genetics research programs. They would have to find 
other funding sources or scale back their research. 
In fact, university usage of patents is taking off. Even 
"community colleges are beginning to develop intellectual-
property policies to ensure that they and their faculty members 
can capitalize financially on the research conducted on their 
campuses." 141 Universities that do not become IP-savvy may 
forego a potential revenue stream and may be more likely to 
infringe on others' patents, thus becoming subject to lawsuits 
for patent infringement. 
C. Collaboration Between Universities and Private 
Corporations 
Universities and private agribusiness corporations often 
seek mutually-beneficial relationships through licensing and 
through research partnerships. 142 Universities frequently 
discover or invent something that the corporations find useful 
and profitable. However, universities usually lack the means 
to prepare their invention for commercial production and 
marketing. Since "strong IP on its own is useless," professors 
work with their technology transfer offices to license the 
valuable invention to a corporation that has the resources to 
incorporate the technology into publicly usable goods. 143 
141. How Colleges Get More Bang (or Less) From Technology Transfer, supra n. 
130 (This article includes the results of a study conducted by The Chronicle. The 
Chronicle "analyzed the most recent five years of annual data from the Association of 
University Technology Managers on universities' efforts to commercialize technology, 
and developed indicators to compare institutions."). 
142. Smith, supra n. 116 (cited portion from John Grace though e-mail sent via 
Stephen Smith) ("We at Pioneer like to think we have very close, cordial and mutually 
beneficial relationships with a large number of universities, and in particular with 
universities with plant genetics research programs."). 
Further, Stephen Jones, an instructor of graduate courses at Washington State 
University, noted that "the University of Idaho, North Dakota State University, the 
University of Minnesota and Oregon State University have ... agreements with 
Monsanto to produce herbicide resistant wheat." TomPaine.common sense, Tn (Seed) 
Bed Together, <http://tompaine.com/feature.cfm/ID/5116> (accessed Dec. ao, 2002). 
143. Smith, supra n. 119 ("Having strong IP on something on its own is useless-it 
has to be coupled with and incorporated into a product that people are willing to 
purchase if its going to have any impact. [Corporations such as] Pioneer can provide 
the genetic vehicles into which useful traits can be added that make the overall genetic 
package more valuable and a better investment for their customer to purchase .... 
[Corporations] also have a superb ability to ramp up seed production and to get 
products to the market place."). See Goldie Blumenstyk, U. of Michigan Finds Good 
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Universities maintain technology transfer offices or research 
foundations that have the responsibility 
to facilitate the transfer to industry of technology from 
[the university] and thereby to benefit the public good 
through the development and subsequent sale of 
commercial products. A secondary goal is to generate 
unrestricted funds to motivate inventors and to support 
research and education at [the university]. 144 
While partnerships between universities and corporations 
may be beneficial, they may also be controversial. Historically, 
universities have been considered institutions of research and 
education rather than business ventures with a profit motive. 
This traditional emphasis is being seriously questioned: 
"Commercially sponsored research is putting at risk the 
paramount value of higher education-disinterested inquiry. 
Even more alarming, ... universities themselves are behaving 
more and more like for-profit companies" 145 by "forming for-
profit companies to commercialize their professors' research." 146 
A specific concern with seed companies striking deals with 
public land grant universities is that such partnerships 
constitute an "abandonment of science that addresses true 
needs in favor of solving only problems that have proprietary or 
profit-driven answers." 147 Lastly, some have concerns that 
private corporations sometimes "buy out" the research interests 
of university professors or do not pay a fair price to license 
valuable university discoveries. 148 
University -corporation partnerships also 
about the purpose of public universities. 149 
raise questions 
Opponents of 
Research Is Not Enough, Chron. of Higher Educ. A24 (July 19, 2002). 
144. Mass. Inst. of Tech., Tech. Licensing Off., MIT Reports to the President 2000-
2001 <http://web.mit.edu/communications/pres01109.15.htm I> (accessed Jan. 18, 2003). 
Since they "deriv[e] [their] support ... largely from public sources," state universities 
may be more inclined to "dedicate[] [their] activities and services to the promotion and 
support of public welfare." Iowa St. U., Statement of Patent Policy, 
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/-isurf/policy/patentpolicy.html> (revised and improved 
Oct. 21, 1982). 
145. Press & Washburn, supra n. 106. 
146. Lori B. Andrews, Money is Putting People at Risk in Biomedical Research, 
Chron. of Higher Educ. B4 (Mar. 10, 2000). 
147. Jones, supra n. 142. 
148. Maughan, supra n. 126. 
149. Peter Schmidt, States Push Public Universities to Commercialize Research: 
Conflict-of-Interest Fears Take Back Seat to Economic Development, Chron. of Higher 
Educ. A26 (Mar. 29, 2002) (Schmidt quotes Virginia A. Sharpe, director of the Integrity 
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university privatization (i.e., close business/funding 
relationships between universities and corporations) are 
concerned that university-corporate ties will result in loss of 
academic freedom, conflicts of interest, and the use of public 
funds for private gain. On the other hand, supporters of 
university-corporation partnerships and stronger technology 
transfer programs argue that such partnerships will result in 
local economic development and improved educational 
opportunities. 15° Further, the proponents argue that the 
partnerships are a financial necessity and are needed to attract 
talented researchers to campus.151 
Occasionally, universities' and corporations' interests 
conflict, resulting in lawsuits for patent infringement.l52 In 
addition, universities sometimes require indemnification when 
negotiating with corporations about corporate funding of 
university research. 153 
Corporations are sometimes reluctant to work with 
universities for a variety of reasons. First, the corporation may 
not need the university; typically, large corporations have well-
endowed laboratories that yield more reliable data. Further, 
large corporations are more likely to have specialized 
equipment such as robotics that can work around the clock, 
unlike a team of graduate students. The corporation may 
dislike having to enter lengthy negotiations with the 
university's technology transfer staff. However, if a university 
professor has a significant "head-start" on some commercially 
in Science Project at the Center for Science in the Public Interest. "Obviously. we need 
to have a public debate about what our public universities are for."). 
150. ld. Further, regarding the issue of using public funds for private gain, Joel 
Hardi noted: 
The Kellogg Commission on the Future of State and Land-Grant 
Universities, a 24-member panel that was established in 1996, issued a 
report calling on governments and colleges to collaborate to broaden access to 
higher education and improve relations with their surrounding communities, 
to make the nation's public colleges 'the public's universities,' as Lincoln 
envisioned when he signed the Morrill Act in 1862. 
Land-Grant Presidents Call for New 'Covenant' With State and U.S. Gouernments, 
Chron. of Higher Educ. A41 (Mar. 31, 2000). 
151. Schmidt, supra n. 149. 
152. See supra n. 1 (regarding patent infringement suit by University of Rochester 
against makers of Celebrex). 
153. Smith, supra n. 116 (language of John Grace) ("Indemnification provisions 
tend to loom, depending upon who is performing what activity."). 
771] KEEP THE LICENSE AGREEMENTS COMING 803 
valuable research, the corporation will be more likely to seek 
some partnership. 154 
Consulting is a less formal way in which corporations and 
universities interact. It is common practice for university 
professors to moonlight as consultants to outside entities. 
"[M]ost universities encourage the [moonlighting or consulting] 
activity because they believe it helps to keep the faculty 
members fresh." 155 However, such professor-corporation 
interaction can be problematic for universities that are trying 
to keep close tabs on the intellectual property developed on 
their campus, to which the universities have some rights to 
royalties. 156 Also, though professors are often viewed as being 
unbiased sources of expertise, professor-consultants are subject 
to the same pressures as other expert witnesses when called to 
testifY on behalf of a company seeking to win a lawsuit.I57 
Despite the above criticisms, there are some positive 
aspects to university-corporation partnerships. First, 
professors can use their corporate ties to help place students in 
coveted internships. Second, corporate guidance or 
sponsorship can help professors avoid investing in useless or 
inane research projects. 158 
D. Federal Government- University Partnership: Government 
Grants to Universities 
Universities often receive federal funding for their plant 
research programs, while corporations generally do not.l59 Due 
154. Maughan, supra n. 126. 
155. Blumenstyk, supra n. 1. 
156. ld. ("When professors consult on projects that overlap with their university 
research, and they happen to invent something, it can be difficult to sort out who has 
the rights to the invention." Blumenstyk suggests that universities should have 
"conflict-of-interest polices that clearly establish how intellectual property will be 
managed in consulting situations" (quoting M. Guven Yalcintas, Vice President for 
Technology Transfer for the Research Foundation of State University of New York)). 
157. Maughan, supra n. 126. 
158. Jd. 
159. See e.g. USDA, ARS National Agricultural Library, Plant Genome Data & 
Information Center, 1997 USDA-NRI Plant Genome Awards, 
<http://www.nal.usda.gov/pgdic/pggrantinfo/1997/> (accessed Jan. 2, 2003); USDA, 
Biotechnology Risk Assessment Research Grants Program, Abstracts of Funded 
Research- Fiscal Year 2001, <http://www .reeusda.gov/crgam/biotechrisk/biotO 1nt.htm> 
(accessed Jan. 2, 2003). However, "(USDA Plant Genome] Grant recipients can be 
State agricultural experiment stations, colleges and universities, ... and even private 
organizations, corporations, or individuals." ,John D. Copeland, Nat!. Ctr. for Agric. L. 
Research & Info., U. of Ark., USDA Grants Boost Plant Genome Research, 
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to their mission, land grant universities have special ties to the 
federal government. Overall, however, private investment in 
agricultural research has increased in importance to plant 
breeders, while the ratio of investment by government has 
decreased. 160 One commentator noted that the growing 
percentage of biotech investment is primarily due to private 
corporations investing in their own private research. Though 
public funding may have "dried up" a bit due to economic 
doldrums, university researchers can still seek public funding 
through the USDA or National Institutes of Health. 16 1 
University researchers commonly receive research funding 
from the United States Department of Agriculture Agricultural 
Research Service (ARS). 162 In addition, funding occasionally 
comes from other federal sources such as National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) and National Science Foundation (NSF). 163 
<http://warp.nal.usda.gov/pgdic/Probe/v1n3_ 4/usdagrant.html> (accessed Jan. 2, 2003) 
(citing 7 U .S.C. § 450(i)(b)( 1)). 
160. Smith, supra n. 119 (NIAB) ("Financial resources for breeding come from 
three sources; public taxation, private investment and sale of commercial products. 
Fewer funds for plant breeding are coming from tax revenues. Since 1977, most 
agricultural research in the US has come from the private sector. In 1994, public 
expenditures on agricultural research, in the U.S., were approximately $2.7 billion; 
private expenditures were approximately $3.7 billion (Fuglie et al., 1996). Therefore, 
many further benefits that can accrue to farmers and consumers from improved 
productivity generated by plant breeding will not be forthcoming unless private 
investment into breeding can be sustained or further increased. Private investment 
does not occur without strong intellectual property protection (IPP)."). See Press & 
Washburn, supra n. 106 ("[T]he rate of growth in federal support has fallen steadily 
over the past twelve years, as the cost of doing research, particularly in the cutting-
edge fieldO of ... molecular biology, has risen sharply. State spending has also 
declined .... Meanwhile, corporate giving is on the rise, growing from $850 million in 
1985 to $4.25 billion less than a decade later-and increasingly the money comes with 
strings attached."). 
161. Maughan, supra n. 126. 
162. See e.g. USDA (1997 USDA-NRI), supra n. 159; USDA (Biotech. Risk), supra 
n. 159. 
163. See e.g. Henry Daniell, Daniell Lab <http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/-danielV 
daniell_grants.html> (accessed Nov. 7, 2002). See Ron Southwick, Maya Critics 
Prompt Halt of NIH Project, Chron. of Higher Educ. A20 (Dec. 7, 2001) ("[T]he 
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups [ICBG] program [is] a consortium of 
universities and federal agencies formed to study the environment and develop drug 
treatments using natural products. The program is administered by the Fogarty 
International Center, the NIH's international arm."). See Nat!. 1nsts. of Health, Insts., 
Fogarty Inti. Ctr. (FIC), ICBG, <http://www.nih.gov/fic/programslicbg.html# 
Introduction> (accessed Dec. 5, 2002). 
Dr. Robert Fincher has found that "[m]ost university breeding programs rely on 
state or USDA funding ... [and that] industry funding is very small. [Further,] 
Federal funding from sources other than USDA is limited." Fincher, supra n. 38. 
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The federal government uses the patent system to aid 
progress and development. 164 In a general sense, government-
funded projects focus on broad research that may benefit the 
general public, and during periods of economic growth, the 
government is more likely to fund basic research, not just 
applied research aimed to yield marketable applications of the 
research. 165 In contrast, corporation-funded projects focus on 
research likely to produce a marketable commodity. 166 Thus, 
corporations focus on high-revenue crops like soybeans and 
corn, not artichokes and lima beans.167 However, public-
private partnerships do occur. Although there have been 
"[s]everal positive interactions between academic researchers 
and industry," "[i]ntellectual property rights issues remain a 
major hurdle in forging a public-private partnership." 168 
E. The Influence of the Bayh-Dole Act on Universities 
Universities, private corporations and the federal 
government often develop technologies (such as plant genetic 
discoveries) that have useful and valuable applications in the 
other sectors. The research of one entity or group yields 
161. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000) ("It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use 
the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally 
supported research or development; ... ; to promote collaboration between commercial 
concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities; to ensure that inventions 
made by nonprofit organizations [which includes universities, as noted in§ 20 l(i)] and 
small business firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and 
enterprise ... ; to promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions 
made in the United States by United States industry and labor; to ensure that the 
Government obtains sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the 
needs of the Government and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of 
inventions; and to minimize the costs of administering policies in this area."). 
165. Maughan, supra n. 126. 
166. For example, the wheat industry sponsors some research at Washington State 
University (WSU). Kim Kidwell, a WSU wheat researcher, "select[s] for genes that 
reduce risks of production (disease, insect resistance genes) which enhance 
environmental safety, and improved the marketability of the crop (milling and baking 
quality)." E-mail from Kim Kidwell, Prof. of Crop & Soil Sci., Wash. St. U., to Timothy 
P. Daniels (Nov. 27, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels). 
167. Lurquin, supra n. 98, at 161. Note, however, that some corporations provide 
research grants to professors working on commercially inviable projects, i.e., improving 
the yield of a crop not widely consumed. Such grants are arguably provided as a public 
relations tool, a humanitarian effort, or both. Maughan, supra n. 126. 
168. Natl. Science & Tech. Council, Comm. on Science, Working Group on Plant 
Genomes, National Plant Genome Initiative, Progress Report (Dec. 2001), 
<http://www .ostp.gov/nstc/htmllmpgi200 1/executive_summary.htm> (accessed Jan. 2, 
2003). 
806 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2003 
benefits to the others. 169 In 1980, Congress passed the 
University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act (the 
Bayh-Dole Act) in part "to promote collaboration between 
commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including 
universities." 170 
The Bayh-Dole Act171 requires universities that receive 
federal grant funds to (1) disclose inventions discovered with 
federal funds to the federal agency that provided the funds; (2) 
elect whether to retain title in the invention discovered with 
federal funds; and (3) file for patent protection. If the recipient 
university (a.k.a. "nonprofit organization" or "contractor" in the 
Act) fails to do these three things within a reasonable time, the 
federal agency may take sole title to the invention that was 
developed with federal funds. 172 
169. 15 U.S.C. § 3701. (current through P.L. No. 107-278 (excluding P.L. No. 107-
250 to 252, 273)) (Section 1 of Executive Order No. 13185 (66 F.R. 701, Dec. 28, 2000) 
states, "The partnership in science and technology that has evolved between the 
Federal Government and American universities has yielded benefits that are vital to 
each."). 
170. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000) ("[T]o u..qe the patent system to promote the utilization 
of inventions arising from federally supported research or development; ... ; to promote 
collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including 
universities; to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations [including 
universities] ... are used in a manner to promote fee competition and enterprise; to 
promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the United 
states by United States industry and labor; to ensure that the Government obtains 
sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government 
and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions; ... ") (italics 
added). 
171. P.L. No. 96-517. 1980 H.R. 6933 (codified at 35 U .S.C. chapters 30 and 38). 
172. 35 U .S.C. § 202 (P.L. No. 96-517, 1980 H.R. 6933). Blumenstyk summarizes 
the Act this way: 
Under the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, universities have the right to own and 
commercialize such inventions. But they are also required to inform agencies 
of all inventions. That is to preserve the government's right to a royalty-free 
use of the invention, and its right to 'march in' and take control of an 
invention if it deems that the company selected to commercialize the 
invention is acting against the public interest. 
Universities Try to Keep Inventions From Going 'Out the Back Door': To Keep Hold of 
T~ucrative Dicenses, Institutions Educate, Cajole, and Sometimes Sue, Chron. of Higher 
Educ. (May 17, 2002). See Press & Washburn, supra n. 106 ("The goal of the legislation 
was to bring ideas out of the ivory tower and into the marketplace, by offering 
universities the opportunity to license campus-based inventions to U.S. companies, 
earning royalties in return. Both the government and the business world saw 
universities not merely as centers of learning and basic research but as sources of 
commercially valuable ideas."). 
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A report by the Department of Commerce summarized the 
Act: 
The Bayh-Dole Act created a uniform Federal patent 
policy that permits most Federal laboratories to grant 
exclusive licenses on Federal patents to United States 
businesses and universities. Private firms had been 
reluctant to invest substantial time and resources in the 
commercialization of a Federally developed technology 
under a non-exclusive government license that 
competitors could secure as well. The Bayh-Dole Act 
eliminated this barrier to innovation. 173 
The Bayh-Dole Act caused a great leap in the numbers of 
patent applications filed by universities. 174 "This legislation ... 
enable[s] universities. . . to own and patent inventions 
developed under federally funded research programs. The act 
provides an incentive for universities to market their 
innovations and for industry to make high-risk investments."175 
The AUTM summarized the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act: 
"The rise of biotechnology R&D and, more generally, of 
research in the life sciences, since the early 1980s also boosted 
the number of research universities with offices of technology 
licensing, and increased the incomes earned by these offices." 176 
Continuing, the AUTM noted, 
During recent decades American research universities 
have become increasingly involved in various technology 
transfer activities by establishing technology business 
incubators, technology parks, venture capital funds for 
start-up companies, university research foundations, 
and technology licensing offices. This trend toward ... 
173. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Tech. Admin., Technology in the National Interest 31 
<http://www .ta.doc.gov/Reports/TechNIIchp2e.htm> ( 1996). 
174. Purdue U., Common Questions & Answers Abont Technology Transfer, 
<http://www. purdue .ed u/UNS/hot. top ics/970313. Tech. Tra nsfer2.h tml> (accessed Nov. 
20, 2002) ("Prior to 1980, fewer than 250 patents were issued to U.S. universities each 
year and discoveries were often not commercialized for the public's benefit. Today, U.S. 
universities participating in a survey by the Association of University Technology 
Managers, Inc., (AUTM) are issued an average of almost 1,500 patents per year. 
Moreover, there are now more than 200 universities engaged in technology transfer, 
eight times more than in 1980, as evidenced by the membership of AUTM."). 
175. Jd. 
176. Everett M. Rogers, Jing Yin, & Joern Hoffman, Assessing the Effectiveness of 
Technology Transfer Offices at U.S. Research Universities, XII J. of the Assoc. of U. 
Tech. Managers (2000), <http://www.autm.net/pubs/journai/OO/Copy%20of"lo20 
assessing.html> (accessed Nov. 25, 2002) (internal citation omitted). 
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'academic capitalism' is also illustrated by an increase 
in the number of university-based research centers, and 
by the tendency for some universities to retain partial 
ownership in the start-up companies spinning out of 
university research. 177 
The AUTM went on to explain why some universities find 
"academic capitalism" so desirable. 
Through this variety of boundary -spanning activities, 
research universities seek to facilitate the transfer of 
technological innovations to private companies in order 
(1) to create jobs and to contribute to local economic 
development, and (2) to earn additional funding for 
university research. Technology transfer from research 
universities has been increasingly recognized as an 
engine for economic growth in the United States. This 
relatively new role for research universities has been 
greeted with considerable discussion and debate. 178 
The Bayh-Dole Act was followed by other efforts to facilitate 
working relationships between the federal government and 
private entities. In 1986, Congress passed the Federal 
Technology Transfer Act (FTTA), which "authorized Federal 
agencies to enter into cooperative research and development 
agreements (CRADAs) with companies, universities, and non-
profit institutions for the purpose of conducting research of 
benefit to both the Federal government and the CRADA 
partner."179 
Further, one commenter noted some of the changes 
resulting from legislation such as the Bayh-Dole Act and 
FTTA: 
Before [the 1980s], research conducted at universities 
and supported by public funds belonged to the public. 
But the new laws [e.g., Bayh-Dole, FTTA, and others] 
give academic researchers intellectual-property rights; 
now they can, for example, patent a gene they discover 
or an invention they make, even if the entire enterprise 
has been financed by taxpayers through [federal 
grants]. 180 
177. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
178. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
179. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, supra n. 173, at 32. 
180. Andrews, supra n. 146. 
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Another concern raised by passage of the Act is that it gives 
incentives to public universities to focus more on the 
same type of [research] activities that are being 
performed by the private sector thereby undermining 
[taxpayers'] ability to get basic and fundamental 
research done and into the public domain.181 
F. Universities' Interaction With Foreign Entities 
As the globalization trend continues, universities are 
having more interaction with foreign entities.182 Globalization 
presents both challenges, such as biopiracy, and opportunities, 
such as humanitarian projects in developing countries. 
Biopiracy is a hot topic closely related to university plant 
genetic research. Some university researchers have run into 
resistance from foreign governments when they seek source 
material from abroad (i.e., foreign landraces). Occasionally, 
foreign governments are reluctant to allow United States 
researchers to genetically modifY the foreign plant and obtain a 
U.S. patent.l83 University researchers involved in 
humanitarian-related plant research occasionally have 
difficulty obtaining plant germplasm from less-developed 
countries for use in their research. "This ironically hinders the 
ability of humanitarian-oriented crop research projects ... to 
assist these nations in both characterizing and improving their 
native crop genetic resources." 184 There is great concern 
regarding biopiracy-United States corporations and 
universities profiting from germplasm provided by developing 
countries without giving any compensation to the source 
countries. 185 In contract terms, biopiracy may be considered 
unjust enrichment. 
181. Smith, supra n. 119 (this e-mail solely from Stephen Smith). 
182. See e.g. Outlook, Syngenta Pulls Out of Research Collaboration with IGAU 
(Indira Gandhi Agric. U .) <http://www .outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id= 103244> 
(accessed Dec. 17, 2002). 
183. Kultida Samabuddhi, U.S. Work on Jasmine Rice Causes Worry, Bankok Post 
(India), <http ://scoop. bangkokpost.co. thlbkkpost/200 lloctober200 1/bp200 11 004/news/ 
04oct2001_news11.html> (accessed Nov. 16, 2002). See Chris Wescott, Thai Jasmine 
Rice and the Threat of the US Biotech Industry, Me. Organic Farmers & Gardeners 
Assn. <http://www.mofga.org/news20020119.html> (Dec. 8, 2001). 
184. E-mail from Eric N. Jellen, Assoc. Prof., Dept. of Plant & Animal Sci., B.Y.U., 
to Timothy P. Daniels (Oct. 14, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels). 
185. See Southwick, supra n. 163. 
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Universities have a unique niche when it comes to plant 
genetic research that focuses on humanitarian or development 
applications. Frequently nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have 
contacts and grass-roots level personnel located in third-world 
countries. Universities often have expertise and research 
facilities that NPOs lack. Thus, universities seeking to 
establish humanitarian projects can benefit by partnering with 
NPOs already located in the target country. 186 
Such partnerships are most valuable when they focus on 
small-scale crops like cassava, sweet potatoes, and quinoa, 
rather than major food crops like corn and soybeans on which 
large corporations focus. 187 Small-scale crops are not big 
money makers, yet they can be a vital source of nutrition to 
third-world peoples. 
G. Possible Future Action by Congress 
Congress will probably not amend the general utility patent 
to exclude plant patents. If the amicus briefs filed in support of 
Pioneer are any indication, the plant biotech industry would 
vigorously oppose such an amendment because of its significant 
investment. 188 
Some people involved in the plant IP and research industry 
indicate that the USPTO may need to raise the bar regarding 
IP protection for plants. 189 The USPTO may be giving patent 
protection too liberally. 190 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
186. Universities, however, are establishing more global contacts. Eugene B. 
Sko1nikoff recently wrote about "the internationalization of higher education": "As 
competence in science and technology spreads throughout the world, and as more 
subjects must be dealt with on a global scale, all major research universities and many 
other higher-education institutions have established a wide variety of international 
ties." Protecting University Research Amid National-Security Fears, Chron. of Higher 
Educ. BlO (May 10, 2002). 
187. Lurquin, supra n. 98, at 161 ("[CJrops such as cassava ... , bananas, the sweet 
potato, and oil palm trees are receiving attention thanks to the establishment of 
consortia between developing countries' institutions and Western universities. This 
cooperation would not have occurred if biotech companies had been involved in only 
these applications, because the crops just described are considered to be small crops, 
not worth much investment in research and development."). 
188. Smith, supra n. 116 (If utility patent coverage of plants were threatened, 
"Universities might not scream to the same extent we [corporations] would, because 
while their licensing is important to both revenue generation and also to maximum 
consumer benefit, the revenue stream is not their life blood (as it is ours)."). 
189. E-mail from Daniel Fairbanks, Prof., Dept. of Plant and Animal Sci., B.Y.U., 
to Timothy P. Daniels (Oct. 9, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels). 
190. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetically Modified Crops: The Eth1:cal and 
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expressed concern over the issuance of overly broad patents in 
the following statement: 
The intent of patent law is that the right to exploit 
should be set against the encouragement of further 
invention. Excessively broad claims could, because they 
can block the route to implementation, act contrary to 
this intent .... We take the view that excessively broad 
patents will diminish useful research and so diminish 
welfare. 191 
Consequently, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
"recommend[s] that national patent offices ... draw up new 
guidelines . . . to discourage the over-generous granting of 
patents with broad claims that have become a feature of both 
plant and other areas of biotechnology."192 
There is some indication, however, that the USPTO has 
started to implement some of the suggestions made by the 
Nuffield Council. The USPTO may be "becom[ing] more strict 
in its handling of applications, especially as regards broad 
claims." 193 However, the effects of narrow versus broad claims 
continue to be hashed out in the courts. For example, the 
United States Supreme Court recently held that 
fa] patentee who narrows a claim as a condition for 
obtaining a patent disavows his claim to the broader 
subject matter, whether the amendment was made to 
avoid the prior art or to comply with § 112. We must 
regard the patentee as having conceded an inability to 
claim the broader subject matter or at least as having 
abandoned his right to appeal a rejection. In either case 
estoppel may apply. 194 
The law of intellectual property involving plants is in a 
state of flux and probably will be for years to come. In fact, this 
has been dubbed the "Biotech Century."195 
Social Issues ch. 8 "Broad Claims," <http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/publications/ 
gmcrops/rep0000000112.asp> (accessed Dec. 16, 2002). 
191. ld. 
HJ2. ld. 
193. E-mail from Janice M. Strachan, Sr. Examiner, Plant Variety Protection Off., 
to Timothy P. Daniels (Dec. 16, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels) (noting 
presentation by patent attorney Robert Jondle (Jondle & Associates, P.C.) at a recent 
conference of the American Seed Trade Association). 
194. Festa Corp. u. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1840 
(2002). 
1!J5. Sheila R. Arriola, Biotechnology Patents After Festo: Rethinking the 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
There are three statutes under which an inventor may 
protect their plant genetic research-the general utility patent, 
the PP A, and the PVP A The J.E.M. holding resolved an 
ambiguity in patent law-whether the PPA and PVPA 
preempted using the section 101 utility patent to protect plant 
varieties. To seed companies' delight, the Court affirmed 
inventors' rights to obtain section 101 protection for plant 
varieties. As section 101-protected seeds come to dominate the 
seed market, farmers will have no choice but to purchase 
patented seed each year, rather than saving seed for 
replanting. Besides affecting farmers, the J.E.M. case will 
affect-for both good and ill-universities that engage in plant 
genetic research. 
The benefit of the J.E.M. decision is that universities will 
be able to more easily capture the full economic value of their 
plant genetic inventions and discoveries. The negative aspect 
of this case, however, is that professors and universities will be 
hesitant to publish their findings until they have obtained IP 
protection or until they believe the discovery is not worth 
marketing. 
Encouraged by legislation such as the Bayh-Dole Act, 
universities have become more involved in IP issues since 1980; 
after all, what university would not like to supplement its 
revenue with royalties from license agreements? However, 
there are valid concerns with mission drift as publicly-
supported universities become more entangled with corporate 
sponsors. 
There are some important differences in the ways in which 
universities and corporations approach IP issues. Universities 
tend to be primarily interested in research for educational 
purposes involving the public good, while corporations, of 
course, generally have a profit motive. 
Also at issue is the propriety of United States entities-
corporations as well as universities-genetically altering and 
patenting foreign countries' indigenous plants without 
providing just compensation. Developments in plant 
biotechnology present universities with the problematic issue 
Heightened Enablemenl and Written Description Requirements, 11 Fed. Cir. B. J. 919, 
92:3 (2002) (citing Jeremy Rifkin, The Biotech Century xv ( 1998)). 
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of biopiracy and with the opportunity to provide significant 
humanitarian service. 
The holding of the J.E.M. case may not have been as pivotal 
as that of Chakrabarty (namely, living things are 
patentable), 196 yet J.E.M. confirmed Chakrabarty's broad, 
anything-under-the-sun, 197 interpretation of patent rights 
provided by section 101. Universities that engage in plant 
research should be aware of the J.E.M. holding. They should 
find out whether their source plant materials are patented 
under section 101 because they may need to obtain permission 
to use that source material for research. If more and more 
plant materials receive utility patent protection, universities 
may incur new costs as their technology transfer staff will need 
to be aware of plant patent issues. However, some, if not all, of 
the costs may be offset by licensing revenues if the university 
obtains IP protection on its own plant inventions. 
Timothy P. Daniels 
196. See supra n. 51. 
197. See supra n. 21. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Sen. Rep. 1979, 82d 
Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. 1923, 82d Cong., 6 (1952) (statement made by P.J. 
Frederico, a principle draftsman of the 1952 Act, Hearings on H.R. 3760 before 
Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 37 
(195 I) (quoting .Johnson u. Johnson, 60 F. 618, 620 (W.D. Pa. 1894))). 
